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Sentencing Alternative to an Insanity Defense
Michael Mullan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2020 case Kahler v. Kansas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
constitutional to abolish the affirmative insanity defense.1 The Court
accepted the view that Kansas’s provision for mental illness evidence to be
introduced at the sentencing stage of a criminal trial, as well as to be
adduced to deny mens rea at trial, was a constitutionally acceptable
alternative to an affirmative insanity defense. This article focuses on the
sentencing alternative. The alternative to the insanity defense of making
mental illness solely relevant at the sentencing stage of a criminal trial is
insufficient given the profound legal, historical, and moral underpinnings of
the defense itself.2
First, the facts of the case and the issues that Kahler had with the Kansas
provisions will be examined. In then analyzing the sentencing alternative,
this article will highlight the reality that mental illness often works to
aggravate, not mitigate, criminal punishment, and that separate sentencing
discretion restraints, such as mandatory minimum sentences and future
* S.J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 2017; LL.B., Trinity College, University of Dublin, 2014. Michael would
like to thank his wife Mel and his family for bringing this publication to print. Thank you
also to Dr. David Prendergast, Prof. Michael A. Stein and Prof. Michael L. Perlin for
acting as Michael’s mentors and for inspiring him. Also, thanks to Michael’s medical
team at Dana Farber, particularly Dr. Toni Choueiri, Dr. Douglas Brandoff, Megan
English and Ally Mulloy, for the great care that they showed to Michael over the years.
1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020).
2 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(c)(1) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a) (2011);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); MICHAEL
L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
(3d ed. 2016).
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dangerousness criteria, serve to impede deserved mitigation based on
mental illness. In addition to noting some reform options for addressing
sentencing shortcomings, this analysis serves to critique the Kahler decision
by showing the inadequacy of the sentencing alternative in reaching
criminal justice outcomes that aptly reflect the reduced responsibility and
culpability of mentally ill defendants.

II. KAHLER: FACTS AND APPEAL
In 2011, James Kahler was found guilty of first degree murder and
sentenced to death by a jury for killing his wife, Karen, his two daughters,
Emily and Lauren, and his grandmother-in-law, Dorothy Wight, in
November 2009.3 In the months leading up to the crime, Kahler had
separated from his wife after discovering that she had had an affair with
another woman.4 In addition to his marital issues, his mental health was
significantly impacted because he had been fired from his job.5 The defense
expert stated that Kahler was suffering from a severe mental disorder at the
time of the crime.6 On the day of the murder, Kahler’s son had requested to
spend another day at his father’s home.7 Upon hearing that the boy’s mother
declined his request, Kahler “snapped”8 and drove to the home of his exState v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 113–14 (Kan. 2018).
Id. at 113.
5 Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 8–9, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 186135).
6 Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Insanity and the Supreme Court: The Defense
May Be Unpopular, but It’s a Fundamental Part of Due Process, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6,
2019,
4:26
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/insanity-and-the-supreme-court11570393616 [https://perma.cc/4M7Y-LULY] (“The defense psychiatrist testified that
Mr. Kahler had lost touch with reality due to a serious mental disorder. But the defendant
couldn’t offer an insanity defense, because Kansas passed a law abolishing it in 1995.”).
See also Brief for Petitioner at 10–11, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 186135).
7 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135).
8 Steve Frye, U.S. Supreme Court Will Review James Kahler Insanity Defense, WIBW
(Oct. 7, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.wibw.com/content/news/US-Supreme-Court-willreview-James-Kahler-insanity-defense-562463181.html [https://perma.cc/FY93-RS3K].
3
4
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wife’s mother with loaded rifles in the trunk that he kept for hunting.9 Upon
arrival, Kahler proceeded to shoot and kill members of his family, including
his ex-wife, his two daughters, and his wife’s grandmother—all except for
his son.10 Kahler’s psychiatrist concluded that at the time of the shooting,
Kahler temporarily lost control.11 Another expert psychiatrist concluded
that Kahler did not make a rational choice to kill.12
A. Kahler’s Problem with the Kansas Scheme
Kahler’s appeal contended that he should have been able to argue that his
mental illness prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his
actions and therefore that he should not have been found guilty.13 Kahler
had attempted to raise an insanity defense at trial, saying that he had not
known what he was doing was wrong, and that he should be excused for his
otherwise criminal behavior.14 In this manner, the affirmative insanity
defense is an excuse defense, as opposed to a justification defense.15 The
excuse of insanity concedes that the defendant has committed an otherwise
punishable crime, but indicates they are excused from criminal punishment
due to the impact their mental illness had on their behavior.16
Kahler was precluded from using his insanity as a criminal law excuse
based on a Kansas statute that abolished the insanity defense and only
permitted the introduction of mental illness evidence at a criminal trial
where it helped establish that the defendant did not have the requisite mens
Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135).
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (2020).
11 Frye, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 See State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (Kan. 2018). In fact, Kansas was a specifically
M’Naghten insanity defense jurisdiction before abolition. State v. Smith, 574 P.2d
548 (Kan. 1977).
14 See Kahler, 410 P.3d at 125.
15 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES (2018);
REID GRIFFITH FONTAINE, THE MIND OF THE CRIMINAL: THE ROLE OF
DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIAL COGNITION IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAW 10 (2012).
16 ROBINSON, supra note 15, at § 173.
9

10
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rea—in this case, the intent to murder.17 The mens rea approach permits the
defense to argue that the prosecution failed to offer sufficient evidence to
meet all statutory elements.18 Under Kansas law, a defendant can introduce
evidence of mental illness, and its impact on the criminal behavior, insofar
as it acts as a mitigating factor at the sentencing stage of a criminal trial.19
Based on this evidence guideline together with the mens rea approach, the
Supreme Court ultimately found that there is no due process right, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, to a particular formulation of an insanity
defense—in this case, the moral-incapacity test.20 The Supreme Court did
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–5209 (2011) (“It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any
statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable
mental state required as an element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not
otherwise a defense.”); see also Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Majority Upholds Kansas
Scheme for Mentally Ill Defendants, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2020, 2:22 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/03/opinion-analysis-majority-upholds-kansas-schemefor-mentally-ill-defendants/ [https://perma.cc/U8DK-3W87].
18 Jordan Berman, Overworking the Presumption of Sanity: Clark’s Use of Mental
Disease Evidence to Negate Mens Rea, 55 UCLA L. REV. 467, 467 (2007).
19 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a)(6) (2011).
20 Recent commentary post-release of the decision in Kahler was critical of the Court’s
failure to find a constitutional right to an insanity defense. For example, the influential
scholar Bonnie (who submitted an amicus brief, along with Prof. Stephen Morse, in the
Kahler case supporting the petitioner, on behalf of many mental health law professors)
reacted to the decision by stating, “[a]ll I can say now is that I am surprised and
disappointed.” Mike Fox, Kahler v. Kansas, Listed in Faculty Available for Comment on
2019
Supreme
Court
Term,
U. VA. SCH. L. (Sept.
9,
2019),
https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/201909/faculty-available-comment-2019-supremecourt-term#kahler [https://perma.cc/27YL-FURG]. Bravin believes that the Kahler
decision “exemplifies a significant turn in the philosophy of criminal law.” Jess Bravin,
Lawmakers Can Narrow Insanity Defense, Supreme Court Rules, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23,
2020 7:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-can-narrow-insanity-defensesupreme-court-rules-11584999118 [https://perma.cc/52K6-7N9H]. She also points out
that this decision is likely to encourage states to shrink the definition of the insanity
defense or ultimately abolish it following in the footsteps of Kansas. Id. In contrast,
Minkowitz believes the abolition of the insanity defense is a step in the right direction in
terms of U.S. law being compatible with international human rights law, in particular the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Tina Minkowitz, Supreme Court
Decides
Case
on
Insanity
Defense,
MAD
A M.
(Apr.
3,
2020),
https://www.madinamerica.com/2020/04/supreme-court-decides-case-insanity-defense/
[https://perma.cc/WT42-GCKM]. Minkowitz does however find trouble with the framing
17
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not consider whether there was a right to the insanity defense under the
Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause because the
issue was not properly raised in the lower courts by the petitioner.21

III. SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE
Although not discussed at length in the amicus briefs submitted to the
Supreme Court in the Kahler case, the central issue of the Kahler decision
was whether making mental illness evidence available at the sentencing
stage of a criminal trial, when taken with the mens rea approach, is an
adequate substitute to an affirmative insanity defense.22 This section argues
that the Supreme Court came to the wrong conclusion on this issue. This
argument arises from the observation that “[d]efenses are about blocking
convictions; sentencing factors just set punishment after a conviction.”23
A. Mental Illness in Sentencing: Mitigating or Aggravating?
The sentencing alternative is insufficient because in practice trial judges
tend not to consider mental illness as a mitigating factor at sentencing. It
has been shown that evidence of a mental illness, and associated perceived
of the issue by both the majority and dissenting opinions. Id. She believes that even the
mens rea approach needs to be framed in a disability-neutral matter, rather than using
stigmatic, sanist, and discriminatory language like incapacity. Id. Instead, the mens rea
approach should ask how any issue, including a simple mistake or poor eyesight for
example, influences the defendant’s ability to meet the mens rea requirement of the given
criminal offense. Id. She also believes that psychiatrists and psychologists should not be
the only experts called upon to determine how unusual mental states influence a
defendant’s mens rea. Id. Minkowitz believes that “peer supporters/Hearing Voices
Network facilitators” should be called upon as experts in this manner. Id. Overall,
Minkowitz welcomes the abolition of the insanity defense, but is critical of the use of the
medical model (as opposed to the social model of disability) underlying the Court’s
argument. Id. She provides examples of this language in the Court’s description of those
who have mental illnesses as beasts or child-like. Id.
21 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1059 n.4 (2020).
22 Id. at 1024–25.
23 Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Supreme Court Let States Kill the Insanity Defense,
SLATE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/kahler-kansasinsanity-defense-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/R937-R2PQ].
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future dangerousness, actually acts as an aggravating factor at sentencing.24
Defendants with mental illnesses have been found on average to receive
longer sentences than defendants without mental illnesses.25 Ronnie
Mackay, Professor of Criminal Policy and Mental Health at Leicester De
Montfort Law School, points out that insanity acquittees remain
institutionalized, not at liberty to leave, up to twice as long as their
imprisoned counterparts.26 The U.S. courts have upheld laws that allow for
a longer term of commitment than the prison sentence given for the
criminal offense originally charged.27
In terms of the federal sentencing guidelines, as this author has
previously argued, judges appear to treat sentencing guidelines as quasicompulsory when it comes to sentencing defendants with mental illnesses,
even though they are only advisory.28 In theory, federal sentencing
guidelines are conducive to having a positive effect on reducing sentence

Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 435 (1995).
25 Patricia A. Zapf et al., Insanity in the Courtroom: Issues of Criminal Responsibility
and Competency to Stand Trial, in PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTISE IN COURT 79, 84 (Daniel
A. Krauss & Joel D. Lieberman eds., 2009); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 171–72 (1982); Mirko Bagaric, A Rational (Unapologetically
Pragmatic) Approach to Dealing with the Irrational - The Sentencing of Offenders with
Mental Disorders, 29 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 27 (2016). Other reasons for this trend
include the reduced ability of defendants to assist counsel and the reduced ability to
understand their criminal proceedings. Jeff Bouffard et al., The Effectiveness of
Specialized Legal Counsel and Case Management Services for Indigent Offenders with
Mental Illness, 4 HEALTH JUST. 7 (2016); Joe Hennell, Mental Illness on Appeal and the
Right to Assist Counsel, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 350 (2013); Rebecca J.
Covarrubias, Lives in Defense Counsel’s Hands: The Problems and Responsibilities of
Defense Counsel Representing Mentally Ill or Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 11
SCHOLAR 413 (2009); Allison D. Redlich, Mental Illness, Police Interrogations, and the
Potential for False Confession, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 19, 20 (2004); Allison D.
Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas Among Offenders
with Mental Illness, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 81–82 (2010).
26 R. D. MACKAY, MENTAL CONDITION DEFENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW 112 (1995).
27 Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043 (1983).
28 Michael Mullan, How Should Mental Illness Be Relevant to Sentencing?, 88 MISS.
L.J. 255, 266 (2019).
24
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length for offenders with mental illnesses. This is because evidence of a
mental illness is supposed to only operate in a mitigating manner and act as
a downward departure from the recommended sentence.29 However, in
reality the opposite often occurs.30 According to United States v.
McBroom,31 mental illness can be considered as a mitigating factor in three
sections of the federal sentencing guidelines: First, § 5H1.3 can allow a
judge to bring in sentencing related-evidence on mental illness because this
section of the guidelines looks at the mental and emotional conditions of the
offender.32 Second, mental illness could also be relevant to the sentencing
decision under § 3553(a)(1), as this concerns the history and characteristics
of the defendant.33 Finally, under § 5K2.13,34 if a defendant’s mental illness
significantly reduced their mental capacity at the time of the offense and
this substantially contributed to their commission of the crime, then that
mental illness can act as a mitigating factor. Unfortunately, as Perlin and
Gould point out, the exceptions to the recommended sentencing guidelines
based on a defendant’s mental illness are rarely used by the judiciary.35 It is
uncertain how often a similar provision in Kansas’s statute book is used.
This statute provides that the trial judge can take into account how “[t]he

See United States v. Portman, 599 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 838–39 (10th Cir. 2008).
30 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 171–72; Bagaric, supra note 25, at 27.
31 United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997).
32 U.S.
SENT’G
COMM’N,
2016
GUIDELINES
MANUAL
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual
[https://perma.cc/M65N2TLM].
33 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2018).
34 2016 GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 32, at § 5H1.3.
35 Perlin & Gould, supra note 24, at 447 (citing United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp.
861 (D.D.C. 1989)) as an exception to this trend); See also Michael L. Perlin, “I
Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of PTSD on Criminal
Sentencing After the Promulgation of DSM-5, 4 UTAH L. REV. 881, 886 (2015).
29
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offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial
capacity for judgment when the offense was committed.”36
On the other hand, mental illness can be an aggravating factor at
sentencing, in particular under § 3553(a) which lists factors that are
designed “to protect the public from further crimes.”37 We can see here,
under either sentencing guidelines or state criminal law, how a defendant’s
mental illness can be indicative of future dangerousness.38 In United States
v. Hines, the defendant received a harsher sentence due to his
“extraordinary danger to the community” as evidenced by his severe mental
illness.39 Similarly, a heightened sentence was handed down in United
States v. Strange largely due to the defendant’s schizophrenia.40 In United
States v. McKenley, the trial court considered prior dangerous crimes,
namely murder/manslaughter and prior assaults.41 Although the defendant
was found not guilty by reason of insanity, McKenley held that it could be
used as evidence of future dangerousness, and the trial court was allowed
use this factor to impose a higher sentence than the sentencing guidelines
recommended.42 As LaFave points out, in cases such as this, “[p]ast violent
acts may be used in sentencing, even if they did not lead to conviction.”43
Conversely, in United States v. Moses, the court vacated the lengthier
sentence that was based on perceived enhanced dangerousness and the

Orin S. Kerr, Due Process and the Criminal Law: A Few Thoughts on Kahler v.
Kansas, REASON (Mar. 24, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/03/24/due-process-and-thecriminal-law-a-few-thoughts-on-kahler-v-kansas/ [https://perma.cc/8WEE-976Y].
37 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)) (2018).
38 Fatma Marouf, Assumed Sane, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 25, 37 (2016); Ellen
Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There Hope for a
Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility / Consequences Talk?, 57 ARK. L. REV.
447, 522 (2004).
39 United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d 1469, 1477 (9th Cir. 1994).
40 United States v. Strange, 892 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1989).
41 United States v. McKenley, 895 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1990).
42 Id.
43 See ROBINSON, supra note 15, at § 173.
36
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defendant’s mental illness.44 Additionally, the appellate court recommended
that civil commitment was the preferred sentence type.45 The relevance of
mental illness to the sentencing decision is uncertain and unpredictable—it
can be ignored by the judge, act as a mitigating factor, or act as an
aggravating factor.46
B. Constraints on Sentencing Discretion
Outside of the sentencing guidelines, judges can be constrained by
mandatory minimums,47 whereby they are encouraged to ignore a
defendant’s mental illness as being relevant to the sentencing decision.48 In
another way, the trial judges are not similarly restrained, as they have the
discretion to reduce the sentence based on the three options outlined above
and can also change the punishment type. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 allows judges
to make “medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment” as a provision of
the defendant’s probation.49 Kansas has a similar provision that allows the
sentencing judge to send the defendant to a psychiatric institution for
treatment and the same rules around civil commitment apply.50
While administering higher sentences based on future dangerousness
stemming from their mental illness appears unfair, the question nonetheless
arises: do not all individuals with and without mental illness receive higher
sentences in accordance with their perceived dangerousness to society? Is
mental illness a reasonable indicator of future dangerousness?51 Another

United States v. Moses, 106 F.3d 1273, 1273 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1280–81.
46 Mullan, supra note 28, at 273.
47 Fiona Sampson, Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Women with Disabilities, 39
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 589 (2001).
48 Perlin & Gould, supra note 24, at 444.
49 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9).
50 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3430 (2014).
51 Perlin & Gould, supra note 24, at 444; Melissa Schaefer Morabito & Kelly M. Socia,
Is Dangerousness a Myth? Injuries and Police Encounters with People with Mental
Illnesses, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 253, 254 (2015).
44
45
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reason for reducing the sentence of offenders with mental illnesses is due to
the predicated harsher punishment based on their heightened negative
experience of prison as a result of their mental illness.52 Given that
prisoners with mental illnesses are more likely to experience “physical and
sexual assault, behavioral issues, solitary confinement, and exacerbation of
their mental illness,”53 we can see how such punishment undermines the
punishment goals of equality and parity.54
C. Reform Questions and the Problem with Kahler
In terms of sentencing reform, Bagaric, an expert on sentencing and
punishment, believes there should be an automatic 10% reduction in
sentence length where mental illness is proved to have existed at the time
the crime was committed.55 Because causation is too difficult to prove,
Bagaric also recommends that a link between the mental illness and the
crime need not be proved.56 He also calls for a further reduction in sentence
E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 147 (2013).
53 Mullan, supra note 28, at 421–26; FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS:
CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 32–33 (rev. ed. 1998); Jamie
Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 391 (2006); E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The
Case of Seriously Disordered Offenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 636–43 (2014)
(noting in most states insanity defenses are not allowed in disciplinary hearings); SASHA
ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS
AND
OFFENDERS
WITH
MENTAL
ILLNESS
(2003),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2AZ2SEFH].
54 Donald Braman, Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2097
(2006).
55 Bagaric, supra note 25, at 5.
56 Bagaric, supra note 25, at 6. In terms of any affirmative insanity defense, it is not
enough to merely prove that a defendant has a diagnosis of a mental illness as found in
the DSM VI. Jareb Gleckel & John Blume, Kahler v. Kansas: Oral Argument 2.0, OYEZ,
https://argument2.oyez.org/2019/kahler-v-kansas/ [https://perma.cc/H39X-BF5X]. The
mental illness must have with it a symptom that results in a “significant disturbance of
thought.” Id. Penultimately, in terms of causation, the defendant must prove a link
between the mental illness at hand and the crime that was committed. Id. Then, the
52
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length (up to 50%) if it can be proven that the defendant is particularly
vulnerable to experience their prison sentence in a harsher manner than the
average prisoner, as explained in the previous paragraph.57 Another element
of reform should include judicial training on the matter because judges are
either unaware of or unwilling to use the opportunities currently available to
reduce the sentence of offenders with mental illnesses.58 Efforts should also
be made to improve presentence reports59— they should include the
relevant medical history of the defendant60—so that the trial judge and jury
are provided with sufficient background information on the defendant’s
mental illness.61
In regard to the Supreme Court’s evaluation of mental illness evidence
being allowed at the sentencing stage, the Court in the Kahler case
explained that this allows the trial judge to channel the consideration of the
mental illness to the penalty stage of a trial. The introduction of mental
illness evidence allows the sentencing judge to individualize the sentence
given, to allow punishment to reflect the defendant’s lower culpability.62
This mental illness evidence can also affect the punishment type in Kansas
law, allowing judges to place the defendant in a psychiatric institution

defendant through expert testimony from a psychiatrist or psychologist, must prove that
she or he meets the test for insanity that exists in that jurisdiction. Id.
57 Bagaric, supra note 25, at 5–6.
58 JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & CHERYL IRONS-GUYNN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EMERGING
JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL
HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN BERNARDINO, AND
ANCHORAGE
(2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TLE9-RAU4].
59 MORRIS, supra note 25, at 131.
60 COUNCIL STATE GOV’TS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT
117
(2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197103.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MLD5-9KGM].
61 THE SENT’G PROJECT, MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM:
AN
ANALYSIS
AND
PRESCRIPTION
16
(2002),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Mentally-Ill-Offendersin-the-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR48-EYJ4].
62 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(c)(1)(C) (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a) (2011).
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rather than prison.63 More generally, it is worth noting that this judicial
power to divert is discretionary,64 and it is uncertain how often this occurs
in practice. In Kansas, although the defendant can introduce mental illness
evidence relating to his ability to tell right from wrong,65 or introduce
evidence that he could not conform his behavior to the law,66 these
considerations are permitted too late and have insufficient consequences.
Although mental illness evidence is admissible, this does not require that
the evidence be admitted in all cases and it does not require it to have a
mitigating effect. In fact, it could be, and often has been, considered an
aggravating circumstance in some criminal trials, as outlined in the previous
paragraph. The majority in Kahler believes the sentencing alternative
allows for a more “nuanced evaluation of blame, rather than choose, as a
trial jury must, between all and nothing.”67 However, the Court did not
consider that an insanity defense can allow for different outcomes to
facilitate individualization and nuance: (1) outright guilt; (2) mitigated guilt
at sentencing; (3) outright innocence; and (4) not guilty by reason of
insanity.68 In comparison, under the Kansas statute, the judge can only
lessen the sentence or opt for commitment to a psychiatric hospital at best;
the judge cannot eliminate the punishment altogether, as would occur under
an affirmative insanity defense. Moving consideration of mental illness to
the sentencing stage does nothing to “alleviate the stigma and the collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction,”69 when compared with the
consequences of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. As the
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3430 (2014).
State v. Maestas, 316 P.3d 724 (Kan. 2014).
65 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a) (2011).
66 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a)(6) (2011).
67 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1031 (2020).
68 FONTAINE, supra note 15, at 142. As such, Fontaine calls the affirmative insanity
defense a “complete defense” as it results in no blame or punishment. Id. Their
commitment to a psychiatric institution is not framed as nor designed to be punishment;
instead, it is focused on rehabilitation of the individual. Id.
69 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1050 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Washington Supreme Court in State v. Strasburg observed, the stigma
associated with criminal punishment is greater than that of being adjudged
insane.70

IV.

CONCLUSION

The sentencing alternative to an affirmative insanity defense provides too
little, too late. Even where trial judges want to allow mental illness to act as
a mitigating factor at sentencing, often their hands are tied statutorily.
Furthermore, the type of sentence that is desirable in most cases, namely
treatment in a psychiatric institution, is often restricted. In Kahler, the
Supreme Court’s constitutional validation of a system that does not have an
affirmative insanity defense is a worrying development which may lead
other states to follow Kansas’s example and abolish the insanity defense.

70

State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1910).
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